Upravlyaemaya preemstvennost ('Managed Succession')

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Russian Neo-Revisionism

A revisionist state would seek to challenge the existing balance of power in the system and threaten the foundations of the system itself. This does not apply to contemporary Russia. It seeks to enhance its status within the existing framework of international society. Russian neo-revisionism does not attempt to create new rules or to advance an alternative model of the international system but to ensure the universal and consistent application of existing norms. Russia’s neo-revisionism represents a critique of western practices in defence of the universal proclaimed principles. It is not the principles of international law and governance that Russia condemns but the practices that accompany their implementation. This reflected Russia’s broader perception in the post-Cold War era that it was locked into a strategic stalemate, and that the country was forced into a politics of resistance. This has taken many forms, including the creation of an anti-hegemonic alignment with China and others. For Moscow, it was the West that had become revisionist, not Russia. Although the implementation of applicable norms was patchy, Russia did not repudiate them. In its relations with the European Union, Russia’s neo-revisionist stance means that it was unable to become simply the passive recipient of EU norms, and instead tried to become a co-creator of Europe’s destiny. The struggle is not only over contested norms, but also over who has the prerogative to claim their norms as universal. However, it was precisely at the level of practices that there was least room for compromise, and thus Russian neo-revisionism became another form of the impasse, and only intensified tensions between Russia and the Atlantic system

The End of the Revolution: Mimetic Theory, Axiological Violence, and the Possibility of Dialogical Transcendence

An exploration of the application of Rene Girard's mimetic theory to contemporary new Cold War politics and international relations, suggesting a typology of political behaviours. The current explosion in mimetic violence is the ground for the Second Cold war. The article explores alternative forms of interactions, called political dialogism, which may offer a way out of the intensification of axiological violence. Instead of the political practise of revolution, the article suggests a politics of transcendence

The Death of Europe? Continental Fates after Ukraine

The unravelling of the post-Cold War security order in Europe was both cause and consequence of the crisis in Ukraine. The crisis was a symptom of the three-fold failure to achieve the aspirations to create a ‘Europe whole and free’ enunciated by the Charter of Paris in 1990, the drift in the European Union's behaviour from normative to geopolitical concerns, and the failure to institutionalize some form of pan-continental unity. The structural failure to create a framework for normative and geopolitical pluralism on the continent meant that Russia was excluded from the new European order. No mode of reconciliation was found between the Brussels-centred wider Europe and various ideas for greater European continental unification. Russia's relations with the EU became increasingly tense in the context of the Eastern Partnership and the Association Agreement with Ukraine. The EU and the Atlantic alliance moved towards a more hermetic and universal form of Atlanticism. Although there remain profound differences between the EU and its trans-Atlantic partner and tensions between member states, the new Atlanticism threatens to subvert the EU's own normative principles. At the same time, Russia moved from a relatively complaisant approach to Atlanticism towards a more critical neo-revisionism, although it does not challenge the legal or normative intellectual foundations of international order. This raises the question of whether we can speak of the ‘death of Europe’ as a project intended to transcend the logic of conflict on the continent

The Soviet collapse: Contradictions and neo-modernisation

AbstractOver two decades have passed since the dissolution of the communist system and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 yet there is still no consensus over the causes and consequences of these epochal (and distinct) events. As for the causes, it is easy to assume that the fall was ‘over-determined’, with an endless array of factors. It behoves the scholar to try to establish a hierarchy of causality, which is itself a methodological exercise in heuristics. However, the arbitrary prioritisation of one factor over another is equally a hermeneutic trap that needs to be avoided. Following an examination of the various ‘why’ factors, we focus on ‘what’ exactly happened at the end of the Soviet period. We examine the issue through the prism of reformulated theories of modernisation. The Soviet system was a sui generis approach to modernisation, but the great paradox was that the system did not apply this ideology to itself. By attempting to stand outside the processes which it unleashed, both society and system entered a cycle of stagnation. The idea of neo-modernisation, above all the idea that societies are challenged to come to terms with the ‘civilisation of modernity’, each in their own way, provides a key to developments. In the end the Soviet approach to this challenge failed, and the reasons for this need to be examined, but the challenge overall remains for post-communist Russia

The Putin Paradox

The Putin phenomenon is a response to the challenges facing Russia, but it is also the outcome of the complex reaction between the man and the system. Putin reflects the contradictions and paradoxes of contemporary Russia, but he is also a unique leader who is both more and less than the country that he rules. He is more, because of the extraordinary powers vested in the presidency by the December 1993 constitution. The president is designated as the ‘guarantor of the constitution’ (Art. 80.2), suggesting that they stand outside of the constitution in order to protect it, a paradox of power that cuts through the whole system. This helps explain the emergence from the very early days of a self-designated power system focused on the presidency but not limited to it, which effectively claimed supervisory or tutelary rights over the management of public affairs. The administrative regime derives its power and legitimacy from the constitution, but it is not effectively constrained by it. A ‘dual state’ emerged in which administrative and democratic rationality are entwined. This is why it is misleading to call Russia an ‘autocracy’. The authoritarian features are rooted in a non-democratic technocratic appeal to the pursuit of the public good. The priority under Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s was economic and political reform, and then under Putin from 2000 as economic development, state sovereignty, national unity and international status. Putin’s ability to articulate an agenda of progress, although in contrast to the Soviet years no longer embedded in a coherent vision of the future, helps explain his extraordinary and enduring popularity, which with some ups and downs has been maintained at levels far exceeding those normally found in liberal democracies

Is Putin an Ism?

The Putin phenomenon represents a complex and dynamic interaction between the character of the man, his policies and leadership style. After over two decades in office, we can ask whether there is such a thing as ‘Putinism’, and if so, what are its main features? What are the criteria to be considered an ‘ism’? At the minimum, it requires some sort of ‘grand strategy’ that underpins policy in domestic and foreign policy, and which unites the two. A grand strategy is defined as some deep structure in domestic and foreign policy that transcends individual leaders and which has some overarching purpose. Putinism in this paper is considered a ‘passive revolution’, allowing a profound transformation to take place in society while the polity remains relatively static. One of the main criticisms levelled against Putin is that he is brilliant at tactics, above all in factional maneuvering, but lacks an over-arching vision of where Russia should go. This paper assesses whether Putin is ultimately an ephemeral phenomenon, or whether the era with which his name is associated will endure in history as a distinctive style of rule

The Pandemic, Russia and the West

The Covid-19 pandemic represented a major event in world history, although its political character remains disputed. It is too early to tell what long-term impact the coronavirus will have on international affairs, but its immediate results are clear. The article examines the context of the pandemic and some of the salient effects, noting that it has acted as an accelerant rather than a game changer. The paper then contextualises these changes into the larger pattern of Russian foreign policy, noting the way that the pandemic only deepened and in parts accelerated existing tendencies and trends. International politics remain trapped between post-war patterns in the Atlantic power system and the emergence of new challenges, above all the nascent bipolarity between the United States and China. Russia seeks to manoeuvre in this new constellation, including by advancing its civilisational autonomy. Instead of introducing greater flux into international affairs, the pandemic only confirmed and intensified the existing impasse, and the long-anticipated multipolarity remains more of an aspiration than a reality. The stasis in international affairs remains in place

The new era of confrontation: Russia and the World: 2020 IMEMO Forecast

The annual reports published by Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) on Russia and the state of world affairs act like the rings on a tree, measuring changes over time by offering a snapshot of a particular instant. This report is no different but comes at a time that could scarcely be more unlike earlier years. The Covid-19 pandemic has acted like a savage beam of light, illuminating processes that were apparent yet not fully revealed. The pandemic has also intensified many of these processes, accentuating what had already been observed to be ‘the great acceleration’, the speeding up of historical processes in recent years. Drawing on the analysis presented in the IMEMO report, this comment identifies three key interrelated issues that are now subject to accelerated change: first, the broader retreat of the post-1945 ‘Yalta’ international system established at the end of the Second World War, focused above all on the United Nations (UN); second, the decay of the post-1989 settlement, which turned out not to be a settlement in any meaningful sense; and third, the return of a certain type of great power relations in the Covid era. The emergence of the rudiments of bipolarity signals the onset of a new era of confrontation, with few of the guardrails of the First Cold War and none of the clear ideological markers of the earlier era, rendering this period more dangerous than that of the post-war conflict and more akin to the period leading up to the First World War